Problems of sources of law theory from the idea of Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity

Authors

  • Alexandre de Castro Coura Faculdade de Direito de Vitória (FDV) - ES
  • José Emílio Medauar Ommati

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18759/rdgf.v21i3.1814

Abstract

This paper highlights the problems of the theory of the sources of law considering that law is a collective enterprise and an interpretative social practice, as presented by Ronald Dworkin. Thus, the paper shows that the theory of the sources of law starts from the positivist assumption that law would be a mere matter of fact, from the existence of a rule of recognition, suffering, at this point, from what Dworkin calls semantic sting. Removing the semantic sting, it is possibly understanding law as an interpretative concept, incompatible with a sources of law theory that intends to discovery, beforehand and in a univocal way, what is the valid law.

 Keywords: Jurisprudence; Sources of Law; Law as Integrity; Legal Positivism; Rule of Recognition.

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Author Biography

Alexandre de Castro Coura, Faculdade de Direito de Vitória (FDV) - ES

Doutor (2007) e mestre (2004) em Direito Constitucional pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG); professor do Programa de Pós-graduação Stricto Sensu - Mestrado e Doutorado - da Faculdade de Direito de Vitória (FDV); promotor de Justiça no Ministério Público do Estado do Espírito Santo (MPES).

Published

2020-12-07

How to Cite

Coura, A. de C., & Ommati, J. E. M. (2020). Problems of sources of law theory from the idea of Ronald Dworkin’s law as integrity. Revista De Direitos E Garantias Fundamentais, 21(3), 311–336. https://doi.org/10.18759/rdgf.v21i3.1814

Issue

Section

Philosophy and General Theory of Fundamental Rights