In this essay, I consider Donald Trump’s electoral victory – how did it happen? – and Trumpism as a movement – what does it mean? My concerns are philosophical and non-partisan, but they are driven by a commitment to liberal constitutionalism as a form of government and liberalism as a political creed. I first describe in neutral, rhetorically cool terms how Donald Trump won the 2016 American presidential election. This description is granular. Then, in the second half of the essay, I meditate more abstractly on Trumpism as both a political movement and a movement of ideas. I first describe how populism in general, and Trumpism in particular, is a political response to a crisis of democratic representation driven by globalization. Next, turning to philosophy, I present arguments about the nature of political community made by the German anti-liberal legal theorist Carl Schmitt, with whose work aspects of President Trump’s domestic and foreign policy strongly resonate. I conclude with some reflections on the meaning of Trumpism for the future of liberalism.

Keywords: Donald Trump. 2016 Election in the U.S.A. Crisis of Democracy. Carl Schmitt.
RESUMO


With sufficient hindsight and good polling data, the reason for Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 has become clear as a matter of electoral politics. The story begins in “the primaries,” elections held between February and June in which American political parties choose their candidates for the general election that takes place every four years. In his primary campaign, Trump traded on his public reputation as a successful businessman to capture the imagination of many politically active Republicans. Primary voters are the most energetic and engaged part of the electorate, and in recent decades many of them in the GOP have grown dissatisfied with the traditional, career leadership of their party—a dissatisfaction deepened by the 2008 financial crisis and by the continuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Congressional elections of 2010, in which insurgent candidates from the Tea Party made extensive gains, showed how such dissatisfaction could be translated into electoral victory. As an outsider candidate, Trump accordingly engaged in what from a business perspective would be called a hostile takeover of the organization, using
its most activist shareholders to push out old management. What he offered was an agenda of tightened border security and immigration restriction; highly charged nativist and racialist rhetoric, especially about Latin Americans and Muslims; a confrontational economic stance toward China; a protectionist one toward domestic industries hard-hit by technological change; skepticism of extended military commitments overseas; and a pugilistic, get-things-done, norm-busting style—a style whose attractiveness only grew in proportion to establishment outrage against it. The GOP formally nominated Trump as its candidate at the end of July, and a three-and-a-half-month campaign followed.

Over the course of that campaign, rank-and-file Republicans who might have preferred a more traditional candidate like Governor John Kasich or Senator Ted Cruz soon decided that the party under Trump would still advance their views better than the Democratic Party would. In important respects they were correct, for instance on issues of corporate and individual taxation, business deregulation, religious freedom, abortion, the politics of the sexual revolution, and judicial appointments. They also calculated that the costs Trump might impose on the country as a whole through his divisiveness and lack of government experience would be worth the risk (MUS, 2019). Evangelicals and many other Christian voters, in particular, who widely feel their backs have been pushed against the wall by Democratic policies on gay-rights and LGBTQ issues—especially policies that might require them to act in violation of their religious conscience—thus found ways to justify supporting someone who self-evidently falls considerably short of Christian ideals in his personal behavior. Other Republicans imagined that Trump might be transformed by the office. It is worth observing that multi-party parliamentary systems allow voters a somewhat greater opportunity to be ideological purists. In the American presidential system political interests are cobbled together by mechanisms within our two parties rather than between leaders of multiple parties in legislative negotiations, and voters thus regularly make deep compromises with their political conscience in national elections. In the end, Republicans fell in line behind their new party leader.

Trump voters fall into four broad types, each of which in a parliamentary system would probably form an independent party (EKINS,
Thirty-one percent are fiscal conservatives and moral traditionalists who oppose tax increases, resist greater regulation of business, and are skeptical about immigration, especially unlawful immigration. Importantly, the attitudes of these voters about race generally do not differ appreciably from non-Trump voters. Next, twenty-five percent of Trump voters are economic and social libertarians, a highly educated and informed group who are moderate to quite liberal on matters of immigration and race. Next, twenty percent—that is, about ten percent of the American electorate overall—are economically progressive ethno-nationalists, and for this generally poorly-educated group Trump’s repeated appeals to racial anxiety were especially important and energizing. Notably, half of this group had positive views of Hillary Clinton in 2012. Finally, nineteen percent are what one survey calls “the anti-elites,” a moderately educated group of voters who are a bit more centrist on issues of immigration than the ethno-nationalists yet who along with them—importantly—believe that the political and economic system is “rigged” against them and manipulated by elites of the Davos class. Economically, socially, physically, and psychologically, these people are suffering. Many of them had previously viewed Clinton favorably, and many of them also had been Democrats. They were essential to Trump’s victory. In 2016 between nine and thirteen percent of citizens who had voted for Barack Obama and approved of his presidency switched sides and voted for Trump—especially white, male, blue color anti-elites in key Midwestern states (COHEN, 2017; LEVITZ, 2017; SKELLEY, 2017).

On the other side of the aisle, the Democratic Party nominated a candidate, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had a great deal of knowledge, education, and experience but who was mistrusted by many people—and who over the course of the election came to be increasingly distrusted by GOP voters who had once held a favorable view of her. Trump was very effective at generating this distrust, especially through social media, as was Clinton’s opponent on the left, Sen. Bernie Sanders. They were aided by an FBI investigation into her careless email security practices, and the public may know in time what role was played by Russian digital property theft and information warfare. But Clinton didn’t
do herself any favors, either. Like Vice President Al Gore in 2000, and in contrast to Sen. Obama in 2008, she was a strikingly ineffective campaigner. At the same time, the Democratic Party’s election strategy rested on the presumption that Republican women would decide that Trump’s personal attitudes and behavior toward women were, first, beyond the pale, and, second, more important to them than his policies about immigration, trade, abortion, national defense and foreign wars—and more important, too, than their traditional political identity. The Democratic Party also counted on African-Americans turning out at near the level they did when voting for President Obama, to preserve his political achievements, and on Latinos surging to the polls. None of those things happened. Perhaps they were just fantasies to begin with, based on a deep misunderstanding of politics; perhaps it was poor practical organizing on the ground. In the Congressional elections of 2018, a significant number of college-educated women in the suburbs did decide that they would abandon their party loyalty, at least for now, but that didn’t occur two years earlier. The handful of Never-Trump Republican intellectuals who rose up and spoke against their party—George Will, David Brooks, Bret Stephens and the like—made a good deal of noise, but they didn’t make much difference with the rank-and-file. Nor did traditional Republican Party leaders deeply critical of Trump, like Sen. John McCain and former presidential candidate Mitt Romney.

A final crucial factor is that, as a nation built on the principle of federalism, the United States doesn’t organize its national elections as a general popular vote. Ultimately the president is chosen from within our fifty states. The vote is thus weighted somewhat toward smaller, less populous states, just as parts of the governing structure of the European Union don’t allocate votes on the simple basis of population. For instance, by the Treaty of Lisbon the currently-750-plus seats of the European parliament are also apportioned, like the American electoral college, in such a way that smaller member states receive greater representation relative to their populace. This allocation follows a principle known as “digressive proportionality.” Thus, to take one example, relative to the number of inhabitants they represent, MPs from Sweden are nearly twice as powerful as those from Germany (For political apportionment...
figures, OJEU, 2019; EUROSTAT, 2019). Within the federalist structure of the American electoral college system, Clinton lost, especially in places like Michigan and Wisconsin, where blue-collar anti-elites defected to the GOP, and where—with echoes of the role played by Ralph Nader in the presidential election of 2000—the left-wing Green Party and the Libertarian Party also drew off key margins.

To summarize, then: a hostile takeover of the GOP as an organization; a powerful campaigner with a pugilistic style who appealed to nativist and racist sentiment; a politically ineffective opponent; the resolute holding-together of the GOP coalition; and the crucial switch of numerous anti-elites from the Democratic to the Republican camp. That is the basic electoral story.

But did Trump’s victory in 2016 have a deeper meaning beyond strategic electoral questions, and how should one think about something called “Trumpism” as a movement of politics and ideas? If it is a deep ideological movement, one that will last and even grow after President Trump leaves office, is it orthogonal to the American liberal democratic tradition?

An initial Swedish comparison might be helpful, as it shines an especially clear light on the issue from a comparative historical perspective. The political parties today in Sweden are each the outgrowth of one of three great revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the national revolution, the industrial revolution, and the proletarian revolution, itself splintered into two branches (ARTER, 2016, p. 41-43). These historic pivot-points, and the cleavages they created between voting groups, left their mark on the Nordic and Swedish party systems as they began to form starting in the 1880s, and their echo can still be heard today. The national revolution—liberals versus conservatives (now Moderates); the industrial revolution—city-dwellers versus agrarians (now the Center Party); the proletarian revolution—socialist reformers (the Social Democrats) and communist radials (the Left). Most Swedish parties are inheritors of these historic divisions of interest and perspective. As I have noted elsewhere, the populist Sweden Democrats can be understood as the product of the latest revolution of world-defining scale, namely globalization (WEINER, 2018). One could make the same assertion about the Greens, which is to
say that there is an interesting and unexpected link between those two otherwise very different parties. Trump’s victory and Trumpism as a political movement within the GOP can be viewed in this light as well: as a political outgrowth of globalization. Specifically, Trumpism is a populist response to globalization’s growing crisis of democratic representation and community identity—one that has been exacerbated by deficiencies in western liberal thought.

Globalization, along with the technological changes and liberalization of international markets that made it possible, has created extraordinary benefits, but it is a truism to say that it has also created serious problems. Globalization has raised economic boats around the world, but within many western nations it has also led to economic stratification and left some people behind in absolute terms. As a social matter, it has brought many people together, but it has also increased the cleavage between elites and average people. Globalization does this by fostering an international class with significant loyalties to a world system and decreased loyalties to their native countries. As individuals, people in this class tend increasingly to have more in common with each other in outlook, manners and the like than they do with everyday people from their own countries. Moreover, as a matter of cultural identity, globalization has created unprecedented opportunities for individual personal freedom and self-expression, yet the swift flow of people, capital, and goods across borders has also accelerated and deepened what Marx and Engels diagnosed as the psychic and spiritual costs of capitalism. As they wrote in 1848 in some of the most gripping lines of the Communist Manifesto: “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned ....” (MARX; ENGELS, 1848) This perception ties together right and left critiques of liberalism today. In addition to dashing the economic expectations of many average people, globalization has put their social and cultural communities under stress. It is rapidly undermined the self-consciously shared value systems and structures of interdependent mutuality that are essential to human flourishing (But for a criticism of the communitarian assumptions behind critiques of liberalism, see HOLMES, 1993, p. 176-184).
Politics has been a primary agent of this globalizing trend (CASS, 2018). National political parties in modern liberal states have generally, though not wholly, been aligned with the interests and the outlook of globalizers, those of us who live in the melted, fluid world, and people left behind or cut out can sense that intuitively. Moreover, when political leaders seem to express moralistic disdain for average people and their political choices, that distrust is profoundly amplified: witness Hillary Clinton and her dismissal of “deplorables,” used so effectively against her in Trump’s campaign. In a world not only of economic stratification but of socio-cultural cosmopolitanism, leaders have lost the basic trust of a large segment of their constituents. In a phrase, globalization has created a growing crisis of democratic representation.

This state of affairs creates a massive opportunity for political populists, who recently have made significant gains across the world, from Brazil to India to Hungary, and in 2016 in the United States. There are many ways to define populism; it is a major academic debate. For my concerns as a cultural historian—and here I very loosely adapt a model by political scientist Pierre Ostiguy—what is important is that populists on both the left and right tend to locate themselves on the same side of a binary cultural opposition between the “low” and the “high” in three linked socio-political domains (OSTIGUY, 2017, p. 73-97). The terms low and high here are not synonyms for bad or good; they are simply descriptive, comparable to the anthropological distinction made by Claude Lévi-Strauss between the raw and the cooked. One of the great insights that comes from structuralist cultural anthropology is that binary oppositions like these—in which each term is conceivable only in contrast to the other (there is no low without a high, no raw without a cooked)—underlie not just all mythic thought but also most cultural forms, including those in politics. In three separate, politically-significant domains, populists are semiotic warriors of the low.

The first domain is that of personal style. A candidate’s style can range from coarse, warm and uninhibited (the low) to proper, distanced, and sublimated (the high). As Ostiguy shows, populist candidates “flaunt” the low in opposition to the high as an instrument of political mobilization—to get people to vote for them and work on their behalf. The politically
motivating power of the stylistic low is so great in this respect that it even obliterates distinctions of tangible economic class. Donald Trump has access to vast wealth, but his taste is widely derided as coarse, which only fosters voter identification with him as a champion. In this light, every time members of the global elite expressed public distaste at small status markers of his lack of cosmopolitan refinement, for instance his love of fast food or his flamboyant hair, they reinforced the low-high binary that President Trump uses as a tool of party mobilization. For students of American history, the figure of Andrew Jackson might come to mind (WARD, 1953). One can appreciate Trump’s use of Twitter in this light as well. One of the most important aspects of the U.S. presidency as an office is that enormous expectations are placed on it to solve social problems, yet its power in fact is limited. One source of power that the President does have is the ability to reach out to American voters directly and ask for support, a process called “going public.” By going public, presidents can put pressure on members of Congress to push through the political promises they made on the campaign trail. As a way to meet the crisis of representation, then, President Trump uses the latest communications media, as Franklin Roosevelt once used radio, to reach voters directly, in a common voice—with typos and idiosyncrasies serving as markers of authenticity—and thereby to increase his power vis-a-vis the legislature.

The second domain of the populist low is a candidate’s or movement’s socio-cultural orientation toward local geographic and community attachments. This orientation can range from a nationalist or a nativist “low,” in which local attachment is preeminent, to a cosmopolitan or globalist “high,” where loyalties are multi-national, trans-national, or even universal. A local community orientation doesn’t necessarily follow from a candidate’s low personal style, but the two are often closely linked. Trump the man bears strong cultural and linguistic markers as hailing from a specific neighborhood in New York City, Queens. At the same time, President Trump has centered his domestic policy agenda around anti-immigration politics and economic protection of traditional industry. In foreign affairs he has encapsulated his governing philosophy in the phrase “America First”—that is, his concerns are inward and marked as local. Brexiteers have a parallel identity orientation. Cosmopolitans by
contrast conceive their identity in terms that spill over borders, or that are directed toward abstract principles. They are “citizens of the world”: their community affiliation is often as much to a specific profession or field, such as science, as it is to a place or group of people, as is their policy orientation, for instance toward global development aid or international institutions (for a recent analysis and defense of cosmopolitanism APPIAH, 2007).

The final populist domain is that of political- and decision-making structure. On one side of the binary is the “low” of personalistic and anti-institutional decision-making, as among Latin American authoritarians—or, in the United States, by the head of a tight family business who went into politics (as Trump famously put it, “I alone can fix it”) (APPLEBAUM, 2019). What a preference for personalistic decision-making entails is an expressed skepticism about the complex liberal legal architecture that structures and places limits on majority will, such as courts. On the other side of the binary is the “high” of proceduralist, bureaucratic formalism. This decision-making style disperses power across a range of rule-bound government institutions, which provides many benefits, predictability and transparency among them, but can also raise deep problems for democracy by attenuating lines of political accountability. Max Weber explored this low-high binary in his seminal analysis of charismatic versus bureaucratic authority. The distinction is especially significant today in the United States, because of historically declining trust in traditional institutions, especially among non-college-educated whites.

Notably, in all three of its domains—style, identity orientation, and political structure—the low has something in common: it is about proximity and speed (I depart here somewhat from Ostiguy’s analysis). Personal formality is understood as “distant,” whereas the common touch fosters a rapid interpersonal connection. A cosmopolitan holds loyalties to the far-away, whereas the local is immediately present—loyalty is to this place right here. In contrast to the bureaucratic process, personalistic decision-making is anti-formalist and swift. As a political response to globalization, then, the populist low collapses the interpersonal distance between politician and citizen and thereby promises to shrink political distance and accelerate democratic responsiveness. If one can speak of Trumpism as a party movement within the GOP that will last over the
long term, this is to a good degree what we’re talking about. There is no real equivalent of Trumpism at the level of state or local government, but at the national level, Trumpism is a mix of populist low rhetoric and nativist policies that enables the Republican Party in a globalized world to woo a sufficient margin of disaffected Democratic anti-elites into its camp to achieve electoral victory while continuing to hold together its traditional coalition of social conservatives and libertarians and thereby to push forward various aspects of its national agenda.

Can there be a viable center-right in America that rejects nativism and perhaps more generally eschews the populist low? Is the Republican Party’s face permanently set in this expression? That is a question that will be answered over the next ten years.

But is Trumpism something even more? Does Trump’s presidency signal the growth of a movement of political ideas in America that will outlast the administration and that diverges philosophically from the liberal tradition? (I have argued elsewhere that one signal of the consolidation of Trumpism as a philosophical movement will be its development of a philosophy of history and historical self-consciousness) (WEINER, 2017a). Answering this question is difficult because American political culture is not especially given to the articulation of consistent ideological platforms. Yet there are figures within President Trump’s circle with clear anti-liberal, even anti-Enlightenment tendencies, for instance his campaign advisor Steve Bannon and the intellectuals associated with the Claremont Review of Books (WEINER, 2017b; WEINER 2018; TELOS PRESS, 2018). In their writings, as well as in President Trump’s political posture and rhetoric more broadly, Trumpism begins to cohere as an anti-liberal ideology. More specifically, Trumpism resonates strikingly with the twentieth century’s most significant critique of modern liberal society: the work of German legal theorist Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). It is important to state up front that Schmitt was a prominent legal advisor to the Nazis, but that is far less significant to me than the fact that his critique of liberalism has reverberated into all the important varieties of anti-liberal thought today, including decidedly anti-fascist varieties of left-wing radicalism. Crucially, Schmitt’s critique of liberalism identifies and proposes solutions to the distinctive problems raised by globalization—problems that liberalism has
struggled to answer. In particular, it speaks to the hollowing out of politics and community that is part of our contemporary historical moment.

The core of Schmitt’s argument is straightforward (WEINER 2018). Whereas in the standard liberal account a political community forms when people with divergent interests enter into a social contract, for Schmitt political community comes into being when its members recognize some aspect of their common existence and hold it to be worth defending with their lives. On this basis, a people distinguishes between its “friends” and “enemies,” the latter of whom they are ultimately prepared to fight to defend what makes their community special. A political community, that is, is created through an animating sense of common identity and threat. This is how “the political” as a fundamental sphere of human value emerges, and how it provides the cultural foundation of sovereignty and the state for a society of equals (SCHMITT, 2007). The political—a domain of value analogous to the aesthetic, the spiritual, or the economic—is based on simultaneous identity and opposition. Significantly, Schmitt believes that drawing the friend-enemy distinction is a quasi-theological duty and part of what it means to be fully human. Without the distinction, true political life would vanish, and without it something essential to humanity would vanish, too: human existence would be reduced to mere private hedonism, the pursuit simply of personal pleasure—a critique often made of the culture of cosmopolitanism. One could express Schmitt’s worldview in this respect in theologically positive terms, as the progressive American legal scholar Paul Kahn has done, as a politics based on love (WEINER, 2014, p. 181-187). For Schmitt, the political is founded on the essential mutual regard of community members for what they share beneath their surface-level differences. This recognition justifies the state’s demand that citizens be prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice in its name, and for Schmitt it forms the philosophical precondition of law itself.

Two corollaries grow from this conception of politics—and together they link President Trump’s domestic and international politics together, showing how they are two sides of the same philosophical coin. First, for Schmitt a community’s ability to draw the friend-enemy distinction can by definition brook no conceptual or institutional restraint. Most notably, the distinction can’t be predicated on other domains of human value,
such as morals, aesthetics, or economics. This is a principle that liberals today regularly violate. For instance, they seek to circumscribe national sovereignty within generally-applicable legal norms such as individual human dignity, most famously in Article I of the German Basic Law, and to restrict it through institutions like the United Nations (BMJVS, 2019).

Schmitt views such liberal projects not simply as naïve, but also as a recipe for social chaos at home and unrestrained, imperialistic violence abroad. On the domestic level, he argues, when liberals predicate the friend-enemy distinction on ideals drawn from other value domains, they undermine the state by confusing their community’s own self-understanding. Who are we if our state holds basic responsibilities to everyone? Such uncertainty chips away at what President Trump in Poland, warning about the fate of the West, described as a community’s “will to survive” (TRUMP, 2017). It also leaves the state vulnerable to capture and abuse by self-interested private groups, because its essential duties and commitments become unclear. A parallel problem exists on the international stage. In Schmitt’s view, the liberal effort to circumscribe national sovereignty within universalist legal and moral criteria increases the possibility of total war. By moralizing conflict, liberals become disinclined to make transactional deals with their opponents to limit war’s scope. They transform “conventional” enemies into “absolute” enemies, against whom fighting can never truly cease because it is moralized. This is why the cold war was a truly civilizational battle. Liberals also seek to reconstruct other societies in their own image—after all, they base their own political identity on universalistic criteria. President Trump is thus consistent with Schmitt in insisting that the American goal in Afghanistan and in the Middle East should be killing terrorists, not “nation building” (NYT, 2019). Both Schmittianism and Trumpism in this respect contain a genuine and striking normative pluralism.

A second important corollary of Schmitt’s conception of politics is that as the bearer of a people’s sovereignty the state needs to create clear territorial boundaries that correspond to its friend-enemy distinction. If the territory of a state doesn’t track that distinction, then the identity of its underlying political community becomes muddled. This process mirrors spatially the confusion that results when liberals seek to circumscribe
sovereignty conceptually. Accordingly, at the heart of Trump’s campaign was his promise to build a “great wall” along the border between the United States and Mexico. To some degree, this promise is a serious policy proposal, but it is also a symbol, as its enormous expense, impracticality, and flagrant lack of policy justification make clear. As a symbol, it is profoundly Schmittian, in two ways. First, it expresses the Schmittian position that a community’s political obligations should be physically legible. Indeed, Schmitt himself once explained that the normative order of a political community “can be described as a wall” (SCHMITT, 2003). Second, it expresses the Schmittian view that only by clearly drawing the friend-enemy distinction can a state commit to mutual support and solidarity. As senior Trump advisor Stephen Miller put it, in a statement nearly incomprehensible on liberal terms, “We’re going to build that wall, and we’re going to build it out of love” (FLEGENHEIMER, 2017). That is the spirit with which the slogan “Build that wall” is chanted at rallies. It is not simply a spirit of xenophobia or ethnocentrism but also, liberals need to acknowledge, one of shared good humor and good times, with an eye not only to the enemy but also to the friend.

Schmitt’s view about the relation of politics and geography is reflected in his views about international order as well—and this, too, has Trumpian parallels. Like President Trump, Schmitt rejects the ideal of a global order sustained through international legal institutions such as the United Nations. In aspiring to limit the ability of their members to declare war, he argues, such institutions ultimately seek “to transform the world into ... a global Rechtsstaat”—an ideal as spiritually undesirable as it is practically impossible (SCHMITT, 2011, p. 45). In contrast, he argues, the cause of peace and stability would be better served through an international order of sovereign states defined by their commitment to “the political” and its territorialization. He thereby advocates rooting global order more deeply in the ideal of national sovereignty and extending the principles of the Monroe doctrine to all major players on the international stage (TRUMP, 2017). In Schmitt’s vision of a sustainable and truly pluralistic world order, great nations stake out zones of geographic influence and afford each other mutual regard across those physical boundaries. Indeed, those nations that are strong enough to impose their own internal political
homogeneity need to ally with each other against nations and groups that undermine the territorialization of the friend-enemy distinction. By this logic, it is not Russia so much as Islamic extremism and global liberal cosmopolitanism that are America’s true enemies—and, in fact, Russia can be an important ally against both. The ultimate concern one might have in this regard is that a Schmittian philosophy of international order will be embraced by American voters as they grow increasingly frustrated by the disproportionate burdens they shoulder in international defense and by long-standing global anti-American sentiment.

To summarize: for Schmitt political community, and politics itself, arises from a sense of common values and from the friend-enemy distinction—a robust sense of who we are; that distinction is the foundation of sovereignty and law; it is essential to what it means to be human; it brooks no conceptual or institutional restraint; and it requires territorialization. All have analogues in President Trump’s domestic and international policy vision.

I have presented here three different perspectives on the subject of Donald Trump: electoral, political, and philosophical. These issues naturally are not independent from each other; they are interlocking. In looking at them from a distance, I think one can perceive a common theme running through them whose appreciation I believe will be essential to sustaining liberal democratic government in the future. In one way or another, each implicates a community identity that is tied to a sense of place. Trump achieved electoral victory in 2016 by speaking to a loss of trust in government among struggling anti-elites in the Midwest, deploying the populist low in the service of nativist policies and pursuing an agenda that accords with a Schmittian vision of the relation between people, politics, and geography. Put another way: Democrats lost in 2016 because they forgot where they live; populist movements are succeeding across the globe because they don’t make that mistake; and Schmittian anti-liberalism makes its theoretical claims about community on a spatial field.

If liberals are to successfully defend our views in a globalized era, in which all that is solid is melting into air, I think that we will need to confront the relation between community and place both in practice and in theory. In particular, we will need to foster a robust yet inclusive
“sense of civic place” as cultural parallel to the sense of geographic place and as a touchstone of solidity within a fluid world. Can we develop a politicized liberalism that involves a self-conscious commitment to a rule of law with a strong, substantive cultural and geographic foundation? Moreover, can we develop a contemporary liberal aesthetics on which to ground our advocacy for the practical reform of our constitutions in ways that vindicate popular sovereignty through new structures of political accountability? I hope so. Because the liberal tradition remains the best, most effective vehicle for achieving human liberation, and only a robustly political liberalism will be able to continue to intervene in history—and to endure (particularly in the wake of history’s incorrectly theorized end. FUKUYAMA, 1992).

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